He Describes the Clenfueges Blockade, and Says His Shipe Were Nearer in at Night Than by Day-His Delay There Was Because He Had No Information as to How to Communicate With the Insurgents Until McCalla Came Slow Progress Toward Santiago Explained Says Capt. Sigsbee Told Him That He Didn't Belleve Cer vera's Ships Were to Santiago Harbor, and Denice That Capt. Cotton Delivered to Illm a Despatch Saying That They Were There The Retrograde Movement Made in Account of Coaling Conditions and boubt as to Whereabouts of Cervers.

SHINGTON, Oct. 24.-Rear Admiral Schley appeared on the witness stand before the Schley Court of Inquiry this afternoon and for nearly two hours spoke almost uninterruptedly in his own defence. His words came clearly and deliberately from start to finish. There vas not a tremor in his voice He appeared to be entirely at his case and oblivius to the hundreds of people who listened attentively to every word he uttered He sprung no sensation.

Only once or twice did his voice ring out with some semblance of dramatic fervor. It was evident from the telling that his story had been well rehearsed, and this was apparent from the fact that his two counsellors held in their hands and followed closely a typewritten manuscript of his testimony. One of them, Mr. Rayner, interrupted occasionally to recall to the Admiral's mind something that he had slipped in the story.
Since the Schley inquiry began there

never was such a crowd in the gunners' workshop at the navy yard as there was to-day. The announcement that Admiral Schley would take the stand brought more people than could get within hearing distance of the witness's voice, for the loft where the investigation is being conducted is so big that those spectators who were in the back of the room could barely understand what was being said within the bar.

All the seats assigned to spectators were compled. More room for them had been provided by taking out nearly all the press tables. The aisles were crowded. Around three sides of the room was a fringe of men and women two or three deep. The win-dow spaces were packed with more of them. In the back of the room there were as many people standing as there were people sitting down on the chairs nearer the court.

who had been a witness at the morning at more than ordinary distance from each session, was on the stand. The lawyers finished with him in five minutes, and then Mr. Rayner caused a stir by saying in a voice that could be heard all over the room; "Til call Rear Admiral Schley." A buzz of conversation began and then ceased as suddenly. As Admiral Dewey advanced to swear Admiral Schley, the latter indicated his short service uniform, coat with a wave of the hand the regulations providing that witnesses must wear the frock or undress coat. "Oh, that's all right," said Admiral Dewey and proceeded to deliver the oath.

Admiral Schley began his story at the very beginning, in response to a suggestion by Mr. Rayner to tell it in his own way. Occasionally he twirled his mustache, but showed no sign indicating nervousness He gave in great detail an account of the formation of the Flying Squadron and its progress to Key West, where he saw Adniral Sampson. It was arranged between Sampson and himself, he said, that the former should hold Havana and Schley go to Cienfuegos. Sampson, testified his ships to fortifications and showed him

the Navy Department's order to that effect. Then the Flying Squadron went to Cienfuegos. Schley asserted that he heard guns while he was approaching the port became convinced that the Spanish fleet was there. He admitted receiving the now celebrated "Dear Schley" letter by the Dupont on May 22d and not on the 23d, as he said in his defence to the Senate.

He explained that it was only within the past two or three months that he recollected that those were duplicates of that letter delivered to him. He did not explain his statement to the Senate that this letter confused the situation and threw doubts over the location of the Spanish fleet. The confusion and doubts, according to that statement, arose from the supposed delivery of the "Dear Schley" letter, which told him to stay at Cienfuegos, synchronously on May 23 with the subsequent orders telling him to go to Santiago. He gave as for not leaving Cienfueges sconer the failure to receive the information as to how to communicate with the

insurgents. Admiral Schley defended the Clenfuegos blockade His ships were nearer in at night than by day, he said. The irregular formation by day was intended to tempt Cervera to come out. He explained that writing despatches kept him from departing from Cienfuegos as soon as Capt. McCalla told him Cervera was not there, but did not explain his despatch, written after McCalla reported, saying that he would not start for Santiago until next

Of the slow voyage from Clenfuegos toward Santiago. Admiral Schley said in extenuation that the weather was bad and the small vessels kept his other ships from going ahead faster. He did not detach the small vessels because he regarded them as part of his fighting force, intended to repel torpedo attack, and it was necessary

to keep the squadron together as a unit. His explanation for setting his course so far to the southward of Santiago was that he wanted to give himself "a wide horizon,"

SCHLEY TAKES THE STAND. | Navy Department about he coalless condition of his ships referred to the auxiliation of his ships referred to the auxiliation of his ships referred to the same of the same ships, he said, and he explained his failure to consult the commanders of his ships about returning to Key West by the asser-

tion that he always took the entire responsibility in everything for which he was re-Admiral Schley will continue his testi-mony to-morrow. His counsel expects to finish his direct examination before

the Texas anchored, and there we were subsequently joined by the Minneapolis and the Columbia, and later these two ves-sels were detached and sent off to the coast of Maine, for the purpose of guarding the interests there, which were threatened, or which were believed to be in danger on or which were believed to be in danger on account of certain reports that were trans-mitted in certain directions along the coast of Maine as to the appearance of Spanish vessels at different places. They were replaced by the New Orleans and the Scoron, and later we were joined by the collier

THE SQUADRON PUT ON A WAR POOTING. "During the time we lay at Hampton Roads the squadron was organized, its commanding officers were brought together, the general plan of campaign was thrashed out, the disposition to be made of overwater delivery torpedoes was thoroughly discussed, and I am inclined to say that I found no one of the commanding I therefore determined, as happens on such occasions, to take the helm myself, and we decided, as they were a menace to the squadron, that we would simply keep them charged with the war heads below the

protective decks.

"I put the squadron on a war footing, established pickets and patrols and also the masking of lights, which were under inspection on several occasions to ascer-tain how effective and complete it was. At first there was some fault found Later, at first there was some fault found Later, I am glad to say the masking was abso-The court reassembled after function at lutely complete, so that it was impossible to catch them under way, in column, or in line of battle, to distinguish any one

GENERAL PLAN OF BATTLE.

\*During this time I had explained to all the commanding officers, first, that it was impossible to contrive a plan of battle that would meet unforeseen contingencies, that the general plan of the squadron would be given to the crews in the line of battle, and its general principle would be to attack the leading vessels, to concentrate fire upon them first in order to obtain the moral effect, and, secondly, to throw them into confusion, making victory over them probably very much more successful and complete. I did that for the reason that the older plans of battle had all been to effect centres and rear, resulting in their escape. I felt that the attack of the head of a squadron, which was to some extent new, would involve the destruction of the whole."

whole."

After telling of his arrival at Key West on May 18. Schley said:

"The following morning I went ashore to pay my respects to Commodore Remey. The Commodore showed me a telegraph despatch from the Secretary of the Navy directing me to proceed with all possible despatch to the blockade of Havana. He also showed me a number of other despatches. also showed me a number of other despatches, the purport of which I remember, but not

conference with him, several Cuban resi-dents there informed me that the province in which Cienfuegos was situated was al-most thoroughly occupied by Spanish most thoroughly occupied by Spanish troops, and that we had better be careful in any attempt at intercourse.

TALKS WITH ADMIRAL SAMPSON. I hastened back to my ship in the after-noon and saw the New York approaching. The flagship arrived, salutes were ex-changed, and I went on board the New York o pay my respects and to have a talk with admiral Sampson over the situation. I ound that the Admiral was very much worn, and necessarily so. His responsi-bility had been very great and he had had very great trouble in keeping his squadron ogether, and he appeared to me as if he cas in a great deal of anxiety, which I could readily appreciate. He showed me could readily appreciate. He showed me number of orders. Among them was one a number of orders. Among them was one deciding upon a division of the two squad-rons, one for the northern and the other for the southern coast of Cuba, in which he was given the preference of command. "That order stated that under any circum-

stances I was to remain with my command. I asked him which of the two squadrons he would take. He said he proposed to hold Havana, the northern coast. He also told me that wherever I went I was to remember that they were very heavily fortified and that his confidential instructions (given perhally) were that we were not to risk stances I was to remain with my command. our battleships against the fortified places of the coast until after the Spanish squadron

had been disposed of.

"He told me that the Spanish squadron was somewhere in the Venezuelan Gulf, but that it was supplied with ammunition and stores destined for Havaira, and that that was undoubtedly the point which it was to reach. He said that his information the order to the Spanish squadron to reach Havana or some point in railroad communication with it was imperative and that he believed and thought that Cienfuegos

"We looked over the maps and I must say that I agreed with him. I could not imagine that any one who had studied the military situation could have supposed that Santiago would have fulfilled any of the conditions of the instructions

ASSURES SAMPSON OF HIS LOYALTY. \*We had quite a talk together. I told him that I had been ordered to report for duty to Admiral Remey, and that that necessity to assure him at the outset that I wanted to assure him at the outset that I should be loyal to the cause we both represented.

least possible delay and to maintain it as close as possible. He continued:

"Under the direction of that order my squadron got under way between 7 and 8 in the morning and started westward for Cape San Antonio. Toward 10 or 11 o'clock I fell in with the Marblehead, well up to the northwest. Capt McCalla asked permission to pass on [as is the custom when an officer meets his senior] In a little while I saw approaching in the direction of my squadron a small auxiliary which proved to be the Eagle. The Eagle passed close enough to the Brooklyn to hail her by megaphone. She reported that there was no news. I feel as sure about that as if it were almost burned into my mind, but after

mony to-morrow. His counsel expects to finish his direct examination before adjournment.

ADMIBAL SCHLET'S NARRATIVE.

"Having been ordered by the Navy Department to take command of the Flying Squadron, I proceeded to Hampton Roads, Va., and hoisted my flag on board the United States cruiser Brocklyn, at that time anchored off the Newport News shipworks, for the purpose of having the elevating and rear turret guns installed the older ones having proved defective. There was anchored at the same time at Newport News the Massachusetts, which had been mentioned in my orders as one of the vessels constituting the Flying Squadron. She was there for the purpose of making minor repairs and also to take advantage of the calmer and smoother harbor partially to clean her bottom, which had become very dirty, the ship not having been docked for, I think, quite a year.

"These duties completed, the Brooklyn to hail her by megentous that there was no news. I feel as sure about that as if it were almost burned into my mind, but after wheat I have heard here I may possibly have been mistaken.

"Next morning I saw some smoke ahead and started for them, and conditional there were the Cincinnati and Vesuvius, lying just outside of the lighthouse at San Antonio. Capt. Chester came on board and we threshed out a great many circumstances. The one in which he was particularly interested was the location of the Spanish solliged to go to Key West in a day or two I said to him that I did not think I had any use for a ship that had to go back immediately. Then he suggested that he be permitted to coal from the collier somewhere in the vicinity of Cape San Antonio, the distance of the lighthouse at San Antonio capt. Chester came on board and we threshed out a great many circumstances. The one in which he was particularly interested was the location of the Spanish sollier for him because I did not know what I said to him that I did not think I had any use for a ship that had to go back immediately. Then he suggested that he be permitted to as he was not within my command or under my control. That, of course, satisfied him.

"After this conversation Capt. Chester went on board his ship and the Flying Squadron continued on its way to Clenfuegos. On the morning of the 22d we steamed in pretty close, I think within a mile of the harbor. I could not see into it at all. It was only through the tops of trees that there could be from time to time distinguished. sould be from time to time distinguished the mast of some vessel, merely the top of it. In relation to the matter of that trip spoken of I will say that there were some earthworks thrown up. I should say, about two or two and a half miles from the mouth of the river, and lying immediately under it was a village, but that is ahead of my story. We took a position three or four miles from the mouth of the harbor and toward 9 o'clock of that same day the Dupont torpedo boat arrived and brought Dupont torpedo boat arrived and brought to me the now celebrated 'Dear Schley' letter. I did not remember the fact till within the past month, because there were duplicates of that letter, but I remembered it from the fact that I had sent the squadron to the eastward, in obedience to the injunction of that letter, to communicate with scouts. About those present of Santiago I was very uncertain as I think the Admiral was, on account of some orders having been sent directing them to proceed in the direction of the Spanish Main, but the Admiral was not certain whether they had got back, nor was I, I had sent the Scorpion east I think in the afternoon, some time after the men's dinner, the Iowa came, Lieutenant-Commander Rogers then came on board, instead of her Captain, staling on board, instead of her Captain, stating that he did so because of an injury to Capt Evans by a battle axe having fallen on his shoulder, which incapacitated him. I have no recollection of any despatch from the lo recollection of any despatch from the lowa, beyond an envelope containing some letters, one of which I recoilect was from my wife, but I can recall a great many of these things about which I am testifying because they have been burned into my memory, because I was an interested party. THE CIENFUEGOS BLOCKADE.

\*However, the blockade was a stituted and was maintained at a distance of from three to four miles. The steaming that has been mentioned in logs here was to break the effect of the current so directly into the bight. The Brooklyn was never an accet and west line but was generally into the bight. The Brooklyn was never on an east and west line, but was generally to the south by east and north-northwest. The ships were constantly setting on the beach and were compelled almost every hour beach and were compelled almost every hour to steam off an hour or so. That accounts for much that you find in the logs about steaming. I fixed the position of the squadron every morning and every afternoon by what is known as the four-point bearing. At night we invariable had the lighthouse which was the loom of the city on the douds. We were closer at night, and that was the rule always, both at Clenfuegos and Santiago, and I believed it was there. The nice of go, and I believed it was there. The nice of keeping the squadron in formation during the night, or in line of battle ready for any emergency was never abandoned. The arrangement during the day was with arrangement during the day was with some little feigned disorder in the hope that we might invite those people out. Our wish was that they might come out. The movements of the squadron were rather

an invitation.

\*Lieut. Wood, the commanding officer of the Dupont, came on board on the morning of May 22, and delivered some despatches. That conversation to which he referred I cannot recall, and I have a very good recoilection and very little imagination. Lieut. Wood was almost prostrated, not from fear, but from suffering exhaustion of torpedo boat service, and I told him if I were king I would promote every torpedo boat officer five grades if I could. He handed me a despatch, and I think Wood did me an injustice when he said I spoke disrespectan invitation. injustice when he said I spoke disrespea injustice when he I always spoke fully of Sampson I always called Sampson respectfully, and always called Sampson. The Hawk came in Admiral Sampson. Sampson respectively.

The Hawk came in on the morning of the 23d and brought No. 8 [the despatch from Sampson telling Schley to go to Santiago if satisfied that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos 1 do not remem-ber that Hood [the Hawk's commander] said that the Spanish squadron was at San-

"Mr. Hood, the Hawk and Castine.
"Mr. Hood, the Hawk's commander, got to Cienfuegos some time about 8 o'clock A.M., and the Adula did not get there before 10 or 11 o'clock A.M. Consequently Lieut. Hood did not board that ship in my pressure II he did and got these poles and ence. If he did and got those notes and failed to deliver them to me, then he com-mitted an indiscretion, for I was his super-ior officer and he did not know what I had or what I was going to do. I think Mr. Hood remembered a good deal of what he said to me, but forgot a good deal that he

ould have done.
On the night of the 23d the Castine having arrived, she and the Dupont were sent in as the picket line. When the Dupont in as the picket line. When the Dupont joined the squadron her commanding officer was extremely solicitous about coal, as everybody was. He told me that he had only five or six tons. He wanted to get some from me, and I told him of the result difficulties of hoisting it up and then eat difficulties of hoisting it up and the vering it into his boat, but I sent f Capt. Cook and asked him if he could coal the Dupont, and I remember his cheery reply: Commodore, you can't ask ship to do anything she is not ready I think the Dupont was coaling all and the work struck me as one of such difficulty I didn't see how I could possibly

"When the Captain of the Adula came aboard he reported to me that he had passed the lights of seven ships that he took to be

that message about signals were directly responsible for the delay "The coast was pretty well occupied. Once or twice I saw cavalry, but I thought "The coast was pretty well occupied. Once or twice I saw cavalry, but I thought that shooting at a solitary cavalryman was like shooting big guns at a sparrow. I thought it wiser to reserve my ammunition for the squadron, which I thought was there. I did everything practicable or possible while I was there. I did all coaling that was practicable or possible. We had a good many accidents of which no mention has been made. The Merrimac had several holes punched in her, but we managed later, with more experience, to do a little better than we did at first. Vessels with projecting sponsons always interwith projecting sponsons always inter-fered with coaling. I remember one of the 6-pound guns of the Brooklyn was bent by e-pound guns of the Brooklyn was bent by coming in contact with one of these colliers. We had to be a little more careful than we would have been had we had smooth water. In other words, the problem presented to me was to solve the problem that had con-fronted the navies of the world for thirty years. I think we solved it reasonably well.

well.

"The fact that the Adula didn't come out on the night of the 24th was almost conclusive evidence to me that she had been detained by the Spaniards. On the morning of the 24th McCalla came in. He brought with him the Vixen and the Eagle. McCalla reported to me that he was pretty short of coal."

M'CALLA TELLS SECRET OF SIGNALS. Admiral Schley then told how McCalla had asked if he had seen any signals, and on learning of the lights displayed ashore had told of the secret arrangement with the

insurgents.
"I said," continued Admiral Schley "why wasn't this communicated to me?" but that he didn't know of course. I told but that he didn't know of course. I told him to go ahead and communicate with the insurgents. Meantime the Vixen got under the lee of the Brooklyn and got athwart her hawser, and I thought that she disabled one of her 5-inch guns, but Capt. Cook, who was always alert (and I never met an officer who was always so ready and who handled a ship so well) prevented this by quick action. It was a little late and we were obliged to dismount one of the Vixen's action. It was a little late and we were obliged to dismount one of the Vixen's 5-inch guns and remount it. Commander McCalla sent back for some stores and dynamite for the insurgents and was delayed in reporting by this, but he sent back the Eagle to report that the enemy was not in Cienfuegos. I think that came to us about 4 o'clock Of course, pre-liminary to going, there were to be despatches written and preliminaries made. I don't remember whether the despatch sent to the Secretary was in cipher or plain English, but it took an hour to write these sent to the Secretary was in cipher or plain English, but it took an hour to write these things, and I think we finally got under way between 6 and 7 o'clock. I didn't care whether the enemy saw our signals or not. I was told to mask my movements, but I am quite sure that the distance we stood from the preliminary formation to the place where we took our course of departure westward was outside any distance at which our direction could be seen. we made experiments and found that six and a helf miles was the limit of the visi-x bility of the Ardeis signals and at eight

they all ran together. So that I believe the signals we made were THE START FOR SANTIAGO.

\*As we got out of the cover of the land, the breeze freshened up with rain and it was squally. I recollect going once or twice to the porthole, where I could see the work of replacing the Vixen's gun, and the spray came in. The squadron started then, with the Brooklyn leading, the Massachusetts following and the lowa and Texas in the main line. The other column to the right was composed of the Marblehead. Vixen and Eagle, and the collier Merrimac was on my weather side. That arrangement was made so that if the enemy should appear we could protect the collier, and the Marblehead with the two smaller vessels, would be able to act as torpedo-boat destroyers, and, in fact, I held that the auxiliary vessels sent to us were of that character. Hence the necessity of keeping the squadron to-THE START FOR SANTIAGO.

in case of the utmost necessity.

The weather was bad. The Marblehead had a boom carried away by the seas. The Vixen took seas over her bows and injured a man very much, and the Eagle filled one had a boom carried away by the seas. The same way is the same with the same with water. These ships constantly dropped astern and I remember on one occasion. I think on the 26th, the Merrimac signalled a disarrangement of her engines, and I remember, but do not the engines, and I remember, but do not the engines and I remember, but do not the engines and I remember, but do not the engines and I remember to the same we could not assume that the square way it is squadror with the enemy were going to chase our way. It was probable we would go toward them, which would have been either to Porto Ricc or among the intermediate islands, to We could not assume that the squadror way. It was probable we would go toward them, which would have been either to Porto Martinique. I do not think the enemy will send without cuba. "Conting the continuous a sail passed to the south of us. McCalla recommended that she be overhauled and always thought until the other day that she had been.

COALING ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE. \*Coaling in the day at that time would have been absolutely impossible. I watched have been absolutely impossible. I watched the sea perhaps more than anybody else and was watching for an opportunity to take advantage of coaling. On the 28th the sea was still rough for small vessels, but moderated toward night. The Eagle had signalled that she was short of I called her alongside on the 26th and to Southerland to go to Kingston for co He did not protest against leaving t He did not protest against leaving the squadron; he did not insist on coaling his ship, because that would have been absurd. His ship was plunging around a great deal. He regretted, as I did, that he had to leave the squadron, but it is utterly impossible that he asked to be permitted to coal. I regretted to part with any of these vessels, because I believed in them as auxiliaries. We continued on a general easterly course. I did not go close to Santiago, because I did not go close to Santiago, because I wanted to give a wide horizon so as to have a better opportunity of seeing the Spanish fleet if it left Santiago and started to the westward."

SCHLET'S STORY OF THE RETROGRADE MOVEMENT.

MOVEMENT.
Schley's story of the retrograde movement is as follows:

'I had gone to sleep in the afternoon, as I tried to do on every occasion when opportunity offered. I was just on the point of turning to the northward when we discovered these smokes. But not being certain that the scouts were off Santiago, because of my orders, as well as the information of the Commander-in-Chief, was not on of the Commander-in-Chief, was not rtain upon that point. My purpose in delaying until merning was in order that I might pick up the Scorpion, which I expected back on the 21th or 25th, and that was the suggestion. But we can make a great many suggestions and say a great man things and then do otherwise. I was of the south side, of course, I was not in con-munication with the Department by tele munication with the Department by telegraph. I did not know that we had secret agents in Havana. I did not know that there were any means of communicating. If that was known by others, I should have known it also. I was acting in an entirely independent capacity, I might almost say. I could not be reached by telegrams. My proposed action had to be governed largely by guessing, and sometimes I might guess wrong. Perhaps we are all hable to that. But after communicating I went to quarters and imagined that this might be the enemy. Before that I had not recognized those vessels

be wanted to give himself "a wide horizon," to that if the Spanish ships came west be would have a better chance of seeing the would have a better chance of seeing the common time. For the action of the Fiving Squadron in Eding pact Santiago he offered the explanations that he had gone asleep.

Admiral Schley asserted that Capt. Sinches he had file the communication with the signals ships were not at Santiago, and the communication with the signals ships were not at Santiago, and the would communicate with me and that Capts. Wise and Jewell had likewise had seed the thought it better for me to go of the seed the body of the seed the body of the seed that he forton; had shown Schley or desirers to bin the orespect he would go in with a great deal of pleasures that he (Cotton) had shown Schley or desirers to bin the orespect had shown Schley or desirers to bin the orespect had shown Schley or desirers to bin the orespect had shown Schley or desirers to bin the orespect had shown Schley or desirers to bin the orespect had shown Schley or desirers to bin the orespect had shown Schley or desirers to bin the orespect had shown Schley or desirers to bin the orespect had shown Schley or desirers to bin the orespect had shown Schley or desirers to bin the orespect had the special and Way to Commonore Remey, three the good of the flags him and would common the second that the special shown is a special should be prepared that the floration of the special should be prepared that the floration of the same should be prepared that the floration of the same should be prepared that the floration of the same should be common to the same should be common the same should b

seen them, the Yale or the Minneapolis? He said: 'No, they haven't; they have assured me of that.' That was the assurance I had from such men as Wise, Jewell and Sigabee. I do not believe that any of those men would misstate the truth, that they did not communicate the truth to me. But I assumed that Capt. Sigabee had communicated with Pilot Nunez and had had his assurance that the Spanish ships were not in Santiago harbor. Nunez was aboard. He and I held a conversation in Sranish. Among other things I was aboard. He and I held a conversation in Spanish. Among other things I
said to Nunez: What do you think of the
report that these people are not here?
He replied: I do not believe that they
are here at all. The channelway is very
narrow and the buoys have all been removed; the turns have to be made very
quickly and the channel, aside from that,
is very tortuous! He said that if they
had a tug, with a very favorable day, most
favorable, perfectly smooth water and no
surf, they might get in, but he did not
believe they could otherwise. I asked
him how long he had been piloting there.
I think he said sixteen or eighteen years.
So he was perfectly confident as a pilot
and we subsequently found that what he
said about the harbor was perfectly true. and we subsequently found that what he said about the harbor was perfectly true. He was a very competent pilot; his ser-vices to us were invaluable. After this conversation Capt. Sigsbee went on board.

vices to us were invaluable. After this conversation Capt. Sigsbee went on board. THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH SCHLEY ACTED.

"My habit of life, not only when in principal command of a sing, was to assume the responsibility and venture the censure of any movement that I thought justified, but I was never willing, under any circumstances, to be a participant in glories that I had not assisted to secure. That was the general principle on which I acted. I did not call any council of war. The information which these people gave me led me to infer that the telegraphic communication alleged to have been received was precisely that which was telegraphed from Cadiz, that the squadron had returned. If any of us at any time made any mistakes during the campaign of Santiago or elsewhere, it was in supposing that the Spaniards would ever do the right thing at the right time. That being the case I then determined that a move eastward would be unwise, in that I knew that Admiral Sampson would have moved to the eastward of Havana. It would not have been wise for me to uncover Santiago. The military importance of that movement would have been to guard to the westward, as that would have been the only direction from which they could get into the harbor. As the Cubans had complete and absolute control of the entire line of our movements and of the coast. I have often been surprised to think that Admiral Cervera did not leave Santiago when I left Cicnfuegos. I found out afterward why he did not. It was simply because he could not. Therefore we did not suffer any.

"Just at that time, as we approached on the evening of the 28th the harbor of Santiago, the collier Merrimac, which had been sent to meet us, broke down. I determined, therefore, that an unmanageable collier was not a very profitable thing to have with the squadron, so I first determined to send her to Key West with the Yale. But before that it occurred to me that if she did that and were overtaken we would probably be out a collier, and the spaniards, as they were cutside, w THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH SCHLEY ACTED

in so much coal. Without taking into special consideration any special speed of five to twelve knots (I placed that at their lowest and highest) and considering that the squadron in its field of endurance of the slowest vessel in the fleet, I determined that it would be necessary to emailize the speed, as nearly as we could, to the standard in order to be effective as a unit. That determined the westward movement.

SEVEN SHIPS SHORT OF COAL. The telegram which I sent to the Honorable Secretary of the Navy did not refer only Secretary of the Navy did not refer only to the battleships, but referred to the entire squadron. We had at that time ten ships in the squadron, seven of which were short of coal. There were the auxiliaries and the Marbiehead and perhaps the Texas. The amount of coal reported by me, I think, should have called attention to that and, in fact, I held that the auxiliary vessels sent to us were of that character. Hence the necessity of keeping the squadron together as a unit. It would have been unmilitary and unwise to proceed in any other formation than as a unit. My impression was that military auxiliaries and military supplies should never be abandoned except the case of the utmost necessity. sibilities were involved, that it would have been unwise to consider his own capabili-ties alone. We could not assume that the movement would have been least favorable toward us and most favorable to them. The collier, after the broke down, signalled to me that it would take from three to four hours to make repairs. It actually did take twenty-four hours. Her engines could not have moved, could not be turned over, from the 26th until near 5 o'clock of the 27th. Her engines, according to ber own log, were uncoupled and ordinarily worked compound. So that it was a mistake to say that she was unmanageable

she was not.
"Even though coaling had been possible on the 22d to repair our inequality, I did not believe that any prudent commander would have attempted in a moderate seaway to send a snip alongside a risk. Consequently I would not take it. I felt that my judgment in that case was better than that of any one else, because I was on the spet watching and was charged with the responsibility, which usually makes one conservative; therefore I did not do and I coaled as early as it was practicable; in fact, earlier than it was practicable A DESPATCH HE SAYS HE NEVER SAW

\*On the 27th the Harvard arrived with despatch from the Secretary of the Navy informing me that all possible informa-tion indicated the presence of the Spanish tion indicated the presence of the Spanish squadron. It did not say that the Spanish squadron was in Santiago. Capt. Cotton says he delivered the despatch to me from Admiral Sampson stating that it was there. That despatch never reached me. I never saw it, never heard of it until the other day. If it ever was delivered to me it should have been found among my papers. I know it was not delivered to me, for the reason that a despatch of that character would have burned itself idelibly into my mand. Capt. Cotton did not communicate it to me, so I think his that character would have burned itself idelibly into my nand. Capt. Cotton did not communicate it to me, so I think his recollection is at fault, not his veracity, because I do not believe he would state anything false. Neither my flag Lieutenant nor secretary can remember that despatch or that they ever saw it. It is a little strange that three persons, who at all times had access to my papers, should all times had access to my papers, she

## Sick Headaches

stomach. For stomach derangements, liver and kidney complaints there is nothing equal to the

## CARLSBAD SPRUDEL SALT.

It regulates the organs, cleanses the system effectually, purifies the blood and is a positive cure for constipation.

Be sure to obtain the genuine imported Carlsbad Sprudel Salt; every bottle bears the signature of Eisner & Mendelson Co., Sole Agents, New York.

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That's All!

THE WILSON DISTILLING CO.

"I want to go back for a moment to Cien-fuegos, if I do not tire you. There was another conversation which Capt. McCalla said he had with me. Capt. McCalla belongs to the same category—a man who would not say what he did not think or believe. not say what he did not think or believe. But he did not repeat all the conversation. For example, he did not state that his advice was that the only point on that coast where we could coal was the coast of Hayti. I do not remember any conversation about going back to key West to coal. That I do not recall. At the same time I do not believe he would state what was not the fact. I think that is his mistake. We had, of course, a long conversation about different matters. His judgment was always good. He had cruised a good deal in the West Indies. He was always reliable. always good. He had cruised a good deal in the West Indies. He was always reliable. There was never a difficulty of any kind that McCalla did not have a way to get out of or to get over. But in this particular instance he is mistaken. I do not recall any such conversation, but I do recall a great deal that he did not.

Attention

"After my despatch was sent and we had coaled in view of the telegram from the Secretary of the Navy and of my reply (if that retary of the Navy and of my reply if that reply is not on the record I would like to put it on in the terms I sent it). I gave it to Capt. Cotten in English and asked him to the terms I. him to turn it into cipher, and it was con-firmed afterward in a letter to the Depart-ment, which was received, and the despatch is present here from the Department. The despatch from the Department differs despatch from the Department differs essentially from the one I sent. I merely wanted to state to the court that those were the circumstances under which it was sent. I do not believe for one moment that in the translation of it there was any intention whatever to partifiate it. By some means. actually the same meaning, the despatch did not get to the Department exactly as I intended that it should."

CONTENDS HE DID NOT DISOBEY ORDERS Admiral Schley read this despatch, in which he said that he had to turn back to Key West for coal, and continuing said. On this despatch is based the disobedience of this despatch is based the disobedience of orders. I contend that there was no disobedience. There would have been if I had abandoned my station. But having returned to my station without other direction and having found that the Depart-

will relieve that charge Mr. Rayner—Suppose you read that despatch to which that was an answer and see if it contains any order which could have been disobeyed. Admiral Schley read the despatch from

Admiral Schley read the despatch from Secretary Long, dated Washington, May 25, which said "All Department's information indicates that Spanish division is still at Santiago. The Department looks to you to ascertain facts and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action."

The despatch after telling how to commu-nicate with insurgents who could see into the harbor, went on to say: "Could not squadron and also the Harvard coal from Merrimac leeward of Cape Cruz, Gonaives Channel or Mole, Hayri? The Department will send coal immediately to Mole. Report without delay situation at Santiago de

indicate that in the first property in the property in the first p would have found the insurgents. They were eighteen miles west, and it was not until after the first of June that they moved until after the first of June that they moved up to their position to five or six miles, after the squadron had got there. If we had gone there at the time we got this despatch we would have been in all probability gobbled; so that that despatch there was misleading. I do not mean intentionally, but simply from information which was not, at that time, correct. My answer to that despatch was delivered in English, and I now have in my hand the prignal with my signalure and with the Engish, and I now have in my hand the original, with my signature and with the stamp of the Navy Department upon it. I think that the court has already followed the matter along and I think that, read in the light of that order and of the fact that the squadron did not return to Key West, whatever may have been the intention or purpose, there was no disobedience of orders. The Department looked to me to establish a fact of which it was not sure, and we did establish that fact and without injury to any one.\* Mr. Rayner-Read that part of your de-

spatch referring to it.
Admiral Schley (reading)-\*It is to be regretted that the Department's order could not be obeyed, earnestly as we have M. P., and Patrick Mclingh, M. P., of the

\*Perhaps the despatch is baddy worded, said Admiral Schley.

Admiral Dewey here announced that 4 c'clock, the hour of adjournment, was at hand, but Admiral Schley demurred, saving: "I would like to finish to-day." Admiral Dewey, however, remarked: "Oh, no, you cannot finish to-day." and bringing his gavel down, declared the court adjourned.

here on the Majestic hext wednesday, have been completed by the committee appointed for that purpose. The formal reception will be in Carnegie Hall on the evering of Nov. 3. Justice Morgan J. O'Brien will preside. The delegates will be met at the pier on their arrival by representatives of some of the Irish societies and of the Gaelic Society.

TESTIMONY AT THE MORNING SESSION. The morning session of the court was coupled in hearing the testimony of Lieut. Major Murphy, who commanded the manifers on the Brooklyn: Lieutenant-Commander Harlow of the Vixen, and Capt Clark, the Oregon's Commander. Lieutenant-Commander Harlow of the Vixen, and Capt Clark, the Oregon's Commander. Lieutenant-Commander Harlow of the Vixen, and Capt Clark, the Oregon's Commander. Lieutenant-Commander Harlow of the States are under the Lake sections it should be much cooler in the Middle Atlantic States to day.

Fair weather prevailed generally, except for cloudiness in the Lake sections, the New England cloudiness in the Lake sections. The New England cloudiness in the Lake sections of the Middle Atlantic States and in the Lake sections. The New England cloudiness in the Lake sections of the Middle Atlantic States and in the Lake sections. The New England cloudiness in the Middle Atlantic States to day.

Fair weather prevailed generally, except for cloudiness in the Lake sections, the New England cloudiness in the Lake sections, the New England cloudiness in the Lake sections, the New England cloudiness in the Lake sections. The New England cloudiness in the Middle Atlantic States and in the Lake sections, the New England cloudiness in the Middle Atlantic States and in the Lake sections. The New England cloudiness in the Middle Atlantic States and in the Lake sections, the New England cloudiness in the Middle Atlantic States and in the Lake sections, the New England cloudiness in the Middle Atlantic States and in the Sauther Cloudiness in the Middle Atlantic S mediately. As the despatch had not been sent, the court decided not to receive it. Major Murphy told of two speeches made by Admiral Schley to the Brooklyn's men on July 3, after the battle, or rather of making the same speech twice. In it Admiral Schley told his men not to cheer when the deleated Spanish officers came absard 'it was a gailant speech,' said the Major 'The Commodors made the same speech about midnight'.

Lieut, Harlow had a great deal to say:

Same speech about midnight.

Lieut. Harlow had a great deal to say: in fact, more than either wanted him to say. He had full steam on, however, and the Court, the Judge Advocate and Adviral Schley's counsel had a lively time heading him off. As a witness for Admiral Schley be said some things that were favorable to the applicant and a great many other things that were not favorable to him. Lieut. Harlow is the officer who took notes of the battle from the Via n. He said that the Brooklyn took less than twenty-five manufacts to make the Lieur. Harlow is the officer who took notes of the battle from the Visen. He said that the Brooklyn took less than twenty-five minutes to make the loop, that the Spanish ships turned to the west as soon as they cleared the harbor; that after the bomba-diment of May 3t Schley told him of seeing a Spanish 10-inch gun on a disappearing carriage at Santiage that subsequently turned out to be a tree, that Schley at the time locked like a man who was werried and afraid to take responsibility, that the Brooklyn at all times was the that the Broadyn at all times was the nearest American ship to the enemy on July 2, and that at one time she seemed to be sustaining the entire fire of three

importance. Therefore I say again that I have no recollection of ever seeing such a despatch and that I never heard of it until the other day. I would like to say that there are a great many other things that have been testified to in this investigation that I never heard of before.

SAYS CAPT. M'CALLA WAS MISTAKEN.

"I want to go back for a moment to Cienfuegos. If I do not tire you. There was another conversation which Capt. McCalla belongs to the same category—a man who would th

CAPT. CLARK'S TESTIMONY. A great deal of interest was manifested A great deal of interest was maniested by court and spectators in Capt. Clark's testimony. He gave it modestly and quietly, without any attempt at dramatic effect, but his description of the battle of July 3 was intensely interesting, despite that. Capt. Clark testified to these things: when the Oregon came up with the Brook-lyn the Maria Teresa, the first Spanish ship to go ashore, was still running. The Brooklyn was then well ahead of the Oregon, but farther out to sea. As each Spanish ship went ashore the Oregon would forge ahead and with the aid of the Brooklyn of my compartments is filled with water.

of my compartments is filled with water.

This perplexed him, because he thought
the Brooklyn meant to give him warning
to look out for the chase alone. These
were the only important signals from the
Brooklyn that he remembered. He saw Brooklyn that he remembered. He saw no movement on the part of any of the Spanish ships indicating an intention of ramming any American ship. He had never been informed of any order from the Navy Department not to risk the Oregon

against shore batteries.

Capt Clark told the story of how Admiral
Sampson came to send the Brooklyn after
the suspicious vessel, which proved to be
the Austrian battleship Maria Teresa.

After the Colon had surrendered and the
New York had arrived, Schley and Clark
west over to call on Admiral Sampson. went over to call on Admiral Sampson, There was talk about the strange battle-ship. Commander Eaton of the Resolute reported that he had been pursued by her. "The Admiral did not seem to be very much impressed by this report of the Spanish warship off Santiago," said Capt. Clark. "The Admiral seemed incredulous, and I remember remarking that it might be Camara's fleet, arriving to form a conjunction with Cervera's fleet. The Admiral did not say anything at first, but then turned and said; "Well, Clark, you go after that ship." Believing as I did that really a Spanish battleship was there, I said; 'Admiral, why not take the Brooklyn along?' He turned and said; 'Certainly, Schley, you go also.' I said; 'Commodore, we have knocked out several vessels this morning and we can knock out another one he said; 'Certainly we can, come along.' What I was impressed with then was the cheerful manner of the Commodore and his approving way for having suggested that he go along." went over to call on Admiral Sampson, There was talk about the strange battle-ship. Commander Eaton of the Resolute

he go along."

To Mr. Hanna Capt. Clark told of Sampson's order to attack the enemy at once if they appeared and keep the heads of the ships always toward the enemy, and to Mr Rayner he said that the battle was not concluded in accordance with any squadron order recyclosure issued. order previously issued.

ALICE GUNNING DIES AT LAST. She Lived Nearly a Month After Breaking Her Neck in a Fail.

ORANGE, N.J., Oct. 24. - Miss Alice Gunning, 18 years old, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Alexan-Continuing Admiral Schley said: "The der Gunning of South Orange, who had been juries received in a fall, died late Tuesday night at the summer home of her parents in Belmar. The body was brought to South Crange for burial. The injuries which caused Miss Gunning's death were received early in August. She fell while crabbing early in August. She fell while crabbing from the stone abutment over Shark River and struck her head against a sharp stone, causing an injury which resulted in paralysis of the body below the throat. The third cervical vertebra was fractured.

SACO, Me., Oct. 24 -The trustees of Thornton Academy have accepted a \$20,000 library building, the gift of Mrs. Charles C. G. Thornton and her daughter Miss Mary C. Thornton, of Magnolia, Mass., as a memorial to the late Col. C. C. G. Thornton, husband of Mrs. Thornton Col. Thornton had often assisted the academy and when he died a few years ago it was learned that ir his will he had provided learned that ir his will be had provided that upon the death of his wife and daughter the academy should receive \$50,000 to found a manual training department.

Reception to Redmond Party.

Preparations for the reception to John \*Perhaps the despatch is badly worded,\* Irish Parliamentary party, who will reach

The storm which was in the St. Lawrence Valley Wells, Admiral Schley's flag secretary:
Major Murphy, who commanded the marrines on the Brooklyn: Lieutenant-Commander Harlow of the Vixen, and Capt.
Clark, the Oregon's Commander. Lieut

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